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The Board of Directors and Firm Performance: 
Empirical Evidence from Listed Companies
Purpose: This study seeks to reconcile some of the conflicting results in prior studies of the board 
structure/firm performance relationship, and to evaluate the effectiveness and applicability of agency 
theory in the specific context of Italian corporate governance practice.
Design/methodology/approach: This research applies a dynamic Generalized Method of Moments 
(GMM) methodology on a sample of Italian listed companies over the period 2003-2015. Proxies for 
corporate governance mechanisms are the board size, the level of board independence, ownership 
structure, shareholder agreements and CEO-Chairman leadership.
Findings: While directors elected by minority shareholders are not able to impact upon performance, 
independent directors do have a non-linear effect on performance. Board size has a positive effect on 
firm performance for lower levels of board size. Ownership structure per se and shareholder agreements 
do not affect firm performance. 
Research Implications: This paper contributes to the literature on agency theory by reconciling some 
of the conflicting results inherent in the board structure-performance relationship. Firm performance is 
not necessarily improved by having a high number of independent directors on the board. Ownership 
structure and composition do not affect firm performance; therefore, greater monitoring provided by 
concentrated ownership does not necessarily lead to stronger firm performance. 
Practical Implications: We suggest that Italian corporate governance law should improve the rules and 
effectiveness of minority directors by controlling whether they are able to impede the main shareholders 
to expropriate private benefits on the expenses of the minority. The legislator should not impose any 
restrictive regulations with regard to CEO-duality, as the influence of CEO-duality on performance may 
vary with respect to the unique characteristics of each company.
Originality/Value: The results enrich the understanding of the applicability of agency theory in listed 
companies, especially in Italy. Additionally, this paper provides a comprehensive synthesis of research 
evidence of agency theory studies.
Keywords: Corporate Governance, Board of Directors, Agency Theory, Listed Companies, 
Performance, Italy
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Introduction
The active role in company affairs that boards of directors play (Judge and Reinhardt, 1997; Coles, 
McWilliams, and Nilanjan, 2001) can provide a platform (Aluchna, 2010) and an essential mechanism 
for mitigating the agency problem that arises between shareholders and management (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976; Monks and Minow, 2004). Given that boards are responsible for the direction and 
leadership of their enterprises, it seems reasonable to conclude that directors actively influence firm 
performance (Dalton, Daily, Ellestrand and Johnson, 1999; Stiles and Taylor, 2001), and that they are 
therefore responsible (on behalf of shareholders) for deciding upon the types of board structure that may 
enable them to maximize shareholders’ wealth (O’Connel and Cramer, 2009; Knauer et al. 2018). 
For many years, the major theoretical context of corporate governance research has been agency 
theory (Seal, 2006), and the method for evaluating the relationship between board features and firm 
performance has typically been Return On Assets. Furthermore, the majority of agency theory studies 
are based on quantitative methodologies, and analyse Anglo-American listed companies (Yermak, 1996; 
Dalton, Daily, Ellestrand, and Johnson, 1998; Raheja, 2005); emerging and developing markets 
(Ehikioya, 2009), and selected European countries, such as Spain, Germany, France (De Andres and 
Vallelado, 2008; Donadelli, Fasan and Magnanelli, 2014; Bottenberg, Tuschke, and Flickinger, 2017). 
Little attention is paid to the case of Italy, despite its place as a large European economy with a corporate 
governance model that presents some features in common with two archetypes in the existing literature: 
the Anglo-Saxon and German-Japanese models. However, the Italian model has some distinctive 
characteristics which differentiate it from the two main corporate governance models. These include: 
ownership concentration; the limited role of financial markets; and the prevalence of family-owned listed 
companies. Therefore, it is important to understand whether and how corporate governance mechanisms 
Page 9 of 67 Corporate Governance
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
Corporate Governance
3
affect the performance of Italian listed companies, as these mechanisms are the main drivers of corporate 
governance best practice in Europe (Melis and Zattoni, 2017).
Additionally, prior research into the performance of Italian companies (Melis, 2000; D’Onza, 
Greco and Ferramosca, 2014; Allegrini and Greco, 2011; Zona, 2014) has identified some conflicting 
results regarding the impact on firm performance of a range of board characteristics, including the board 
structure, the role of independent directors, the CEO leadership and ownership concentration,. For 
instance, Di Pietra, Grambovas, Raonic and Riccaboni (2008) found no relationship between the board 
size and performance; whereas Romano and Guerrini (2014) found a positive relationship, especially in 
the water utility sector. Research into CEO duality (whether the CEO simultaneously serves as board 
chairman) also appears to generate ambiguous results in the Italian context. In particular, CEO duality 
has negative effects (Allegrini and Greco, 2011) or positive effects (Zona, 2014) or no significant effects 
on performance (Fratini and Tettamanzi, 2015). As a consequence, it is still unclear if and how the 
assumptions of agency theory are verified in the Italian context. Therefore, this research seeks to 
reconcile some of the conflicting findings in prior studies of the board structure/firm performance 
relationship, and to evaluate the effectiveness and applicability of agency theory in the specific context 
of Italian corporate governance practice. In particular, this study measures and quantifies the relationship 
between the board of directors’ structure and the performance of Italian firms listed on the STAR segment 
of the Italian Stock Exchange over the period 2003-2015. We take into account those aspects which are 
considered to be fundamental to agency theory (Jensen, 1993): board size, independent directors, 
CEO/CM duality (when the CEO acts simultaneously as Chairman) and ownership. This research 
resolves the contrasting results of previous studies by finding a non-linear relationship between 
independent directors and firm performance; a positive effect of board size on firm performance only for 
lower number of directors; and a lack of influence of directors appointed by minority shareholders on 
performance.
Page 10 of 67Corporate Governance
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
Corporate Governance
4
The paper proceeds as follows: theory and hypotheses development are explained in section 2. 
Section 3 addresses the Italian context and the research design. The core findings from the empirical 
study are outlined in section 4. Section 5 discusses our conclusions.
Theory and Hypothesis Development
The impact of board size on firm performance
The board of directors is considered to be one of the primary internal corporate governance 
mechanisms (Brennan, 2006; Aguilera, Desender, Bednar, and Lee 2015). A well-established board with 
an optimum number of directors should monitor management effectively (Bhimani, 2009), and drive 
value enhancement for shareholders (Brennan, 2006). The board size, therefore, is a key factor that 
influences firm performance (Kumar and Singh, 2013). The board of directors, acting on behalf of 
shareholders, plays a central role as an internal mechanism and is viewed as a major decision-making 
body within companies. Different and opposing theoretical evidence is presented to support the efficacy 
of both large and small board dimensions on firm performance. A minor stream of research advocates 
that larger board size could improve the efficacy of the decision-making process due to information 
sharing (Lehn, Patro and Zhao, 2009). A larger board can take advantage of greater potential variety, 
with directors being appointed from diverse professional fields, with different expertise, and different 
skills (Pearce and Zahra, 1992). Against this, supporters of the mainstream of agency theory (Jensen, 
1993; Eisenberg, Sundgren and Well, 1998; de Andres et al., 2005) suggest that a larger board is less 
effective in enhancing corporate performance, because new ideas and opinions are less likely to be 
expressed in a large pool of directors, and the monitoring process is likely to be less effective (Ahmed, 
Hossain and Adams, 2006; Dalton et al., 1999). Larger boards increase problems of communication and 
coordination (Jensen, 1993; Bonn, Yoshikawa and Phan 2004; Cheng, 2008) and higher agency costs 
(Lipton and Lorsh, 1992; Cheng, 2008). Furthermore, larger boards could face problems of greater levels 
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of conflict (Goodstein, Gautam and Boeker, 1994) and lower group cohesion (Evans and Dion, 1991). 
Poor coordination among directors leads to slow decision making and delays in information transfer, as 
well as causing inefficiencies in firms with larger board size (Goodstein et al., 1994). In fact, several 
empirical studies confirm that when board size increases, firm performance decreases progressively 
(Mark and Kusnadi, 2005; O’Connell and Cramer, 2009). For instance, Conyon and Peck (1998) find a 
negative association between board size and return on equity for a sample of European companies.
Table 1 outlines empirical research conducted at an international level. We, therefore, define 
Hypothesis 1 as: 
Hypothesis 1: There is a negative relationship between the board size and firm performance
[INSERT TABLE 1 HERE]
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The impact of independent directors on firm performance
While it is clear that all directors whether executive (those who hold positions within the 
enterprise) and nonexecutive (those who are appointed from outside) should be treated equally in terms 
of their board responsibilities, a crucial role of the latter is to ensure that the interests of all shareholders 
are protected. A further distinction may be made between those who act as nonexecutive directors (NEDs) 
on behalf of specific investors and shareholder groups and this who might be defined as independent 
directors and have no affiliation with the firm except for their directorship (Clifford and Evans, 1997). 
The role of both NEDs and the independent directors is to monitor management decisions and activities 
by corporate boards and to ensure that the executive is held to account. (Fama, 1980) This implies that 
they are highly responsive to investors, because they have to ensure that management decisions are made 
in the best interests of shareholders. Independent directors are reliable instruments of their companies, in 
terms of monitoring the management while remaining independent of the firm and its CEO (Daily et al. 
1996). This role has been seen as a vital element in corporate governance codes and guidance since the 
earliest publications, and the role and duties of independent members of a board are clearly defined in 
corporate governance codes from all parts of the world and for all sizes of enterprise1.
Only a fraction of empirical agency theory research finds a negative relationship (Khumar and 
Singh, 2012) or no relationship (Bhagat and Blac, 2002) between the proportion of independent directors 
and firm performance. On the other hand, the majority of empirical (Brickley, Coles and Rory 1994; 
Anderson, Manci and Reeb, 2004) and theoretical (Beasley, 1996) agency theory focused research 
suggests that independent directors have a positive effect on firm performance. A higher proportion of 
independent directors on boards should result in a more effective monitoring role and limit managerial 
opportunism. This should lead to increased shareholder benefits (Byrd and Hickman, 1992) and an 
1 For example, Cadbury (UK), 1992; Comitato per la Corporate Governance (Italy), 2015; Hawkamah (UAE), 2011.
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enhancement to the economic and financial performance of the firm (Waldo, 1985; Vancil, 1987) 
measured by return on assets, profit margins and dividend yields (Brown and Caylor, 2004). Consistent 
with this research, Rosenstein and Wyatt (1990) suggest that shareholder wealth is influenced by the 
proportion of outside directors; their study document a positive stock price reaction at the announcement 
of the appointment of an additional outside director. This means that the monitoring and controlling role 
on management provided by independent directors is fundamental in order to reduce the likelihood of 
financial statement fraud (Beasley, 1996), and it is also likely to benefit shareholders (Byrd and Hickman, 
1992). For the purposes of this study regressions were only practicable on the composition of the 
management board.
Table 2 shows prior international literature that explores the relationship between independent 
directors and corporate performance.
Our second hypothesis is therefore as follows:
Hypothesis 2: There is a positive relationship between the proportion of independent directors 
and firm performance.
[INSERT TABLE 2 HERE]
The impact of board size with the moderating effect of independent directors on firm performance
The impact of board size on firm performance can be moderated by the percentage of independent 
directors sitting on the board (Dalton et al., 1998). Based on the mainstream of agency theory, greater 
board size means more problems for communication, coordination, and decision-making (Eisenberg et 
al., 1998 and Beiner, Drobetz, Schmid, and Zimmermann, 2006). Similarly, independent directors with 
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8
an excessively high number of other positions can have a negative impact on firm performance, given 
their commitments in other companies (Ibrahim and Samad, 2006), their lack of time (Masulis and Mobbs, 
2009) and information asymmetry (Baysinger and Hoskisson, 1990). Previous research (e.g., Yermack, 
1996; Eisenberg et al., 1998) proposes that large boards with a high number of independent directors do 
not generate positive firm performance because the board size in conjunction with a high proportion of 
independent directors worsens the free riding problem2 (Hermalin and Weisbach, 2003) among directors 
relating to the monitoring of management (Lasfer, 2002), resulting in the board taking decisions that 
negatively affect firm performance. Accordingly, independent directors can improve effective board 
monitoring (Tihanyi, Johnson, Hoskisson and Hitt, 2003), because they can be valuable in aligning 
shareholders and managers’ interests 6. By doing so, independent directors ensure that managers 
implement executive decisions that lead to performance enhancement (Musteen, Datta and Hermann, 
2009). Some studies (Agrawal and Knoeber 1996; Guest, 2009) suggest that an excessive number of 
independent directors negatively affects board size and firm performance, and that smaller boards with a 
higher proportion of independent directors are more effective than larger boards with a lower proportion 
of independents (Del Guercio et al., 2003). Therefore, independent directors can have a moderating effect 
on the impact of the board size on firms’ performance (Dalton et al., 1998). Therefore, we propose that:
Hypothesis 3: The proportion of independent directors moderates the negative relationship 
between board size and firm performance.
The impact of CEO/CM duality on firm performance
CEO duality (where the CEO simultaneously serves as board chairman) has become a topic of 
great interest and a focus for analysis (Lorsch and MacIver, 1989; Brickley et al., 1994; Mallin, 2010) 
2 Free-riding occurs when directors do not properly monitor the management of the firm; this typically occurs when the board becomes too 
large (Yermack, 1996)
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within an international debate on the impact of the separation of ownership and control. Interest in duality 
has emerged primarily because it is assumed to have significant implications for organizational 
performance and corporate governance (Baliga et al., 1996). Two main opposing schools highlight the 
benefits (Lorsch and MacIver, 1989) and the costs (Millstein and Katsh, 1992) related to CEO/CM 
duality. Supporters of CEO/CM duality consider the benefits to outweigh the potential disadvantages. 
For example, the CEO and the Chair might have conflicts between them, leading to confusion among 
employees (Goodwin and Seow, 2000), and damage firm performance (Li and Li, 2009). Additionally, 
a dual leadership structure can provide cost savings by eliminating information transferring and 
processing costs (Yang and Zhao, 2013; Goodwin and Seow, 2000). CEO/CM duality might also 
facilitate a more timely and effective decision-making process (Peng, Sun, Pinkham and Chen, 2009), as 
the chairman does not have to mediate the points of view of the independent directors and the CEO. On 
the other hand, with respect to the CEO duality costs, the agency theory literature suggests that when one 
person is in charge of both tasks, managerial dominance is deeply fostered because «that individual is 
more aligned with management than with shareholders and is likely to act to protect his or her job and 
enhance personal well-being» (Mallette and Fowler, 1992, p. 1016). As a consequence, merging the role 
of chairman and CEO means that the capacity to monitor and oversee management is decreased as a 
result of their lack of independence (Lorsch and Maclever, 1989; Fizel and Louie, 1990). Additionally, 
given the fact that CEOs with specific expertise could negatively affect firm performance (Serra, Três 
and Ferreira, 2016), CEO non-duality may lead to a variety of skills and expertise between a CEO and a 
chairman. In a similar vein, Baliga et al. (1996) and Dalton et al. (1998) suggest that CEO duality 
seriously damages the independence of the board. Indeed, when only one person leads a company, the 
role of independent directors becomes ‘hypothetical’ (Rechner and Dalton, 1989; Daynton, 1984), i.e. in 
the case of the dual leadership structure  the board is likely to function as a “rubber stamp” given the 
total control of the CEO (Rechner, 1989). 
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Many empirical and agency-related studies (Palmon and Wald, 2002; Pi and Timme, 1993; Rechner and 
Dalton, 1991) find a negative relationship between CEO/CM duality and firm performance. The key 
findings of existing empirical studies are reported in Table 3. In line with the core findings from prior 
international literature, we predict that:
Hypothesis 4: Firm performance exhibits a negative association under a leadership structure that 
combines the roles of the CEO and the chairman of the board.
[INSERT TABLE 3 HERE]
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The Italian Context, Data, Variables, Models and Methods
The objective of this research is to measure the relationship between firm performance and a 
number of characteristics of boards, including board size, independent directors, the CEO/CM duality 
and ownership composition for Italian companies listed on the STAR segment of the Italian Stock 
Exchange over the period 2003-2015.
The Italian Context
The corporate governance system in Italy has unique features that make it an interesting case to 
analyse. Firstly, the Italian governance structure is characterized by the so-called traditional model or 
dualistic ‘horizontal’ model (Fiori, 2003; Alvaro, Ciccaglioni and Sicialiano, 2013; Mallin et al., 2015; 
Melis and Zattoni, 2017), i.e. a shareholders’ assembly appoints both the board of directors and the 
supervisory board. The role of the supervisory board is to ensure that laws are observed, and has partially 
remained non-political, i.e. not involved in strategic issues (Melis, 2000). Secondly, the Italian stock 
exchange is mainly dominated by medium enterprises with concentrated ownership (Moro Visconti, 2001; 
Bianchi and Enriques, 2005). Thirdly, the Italian system is characterised by the limited role of the 
financial market; indeed Melis (2000) argues that bank debts are the main sources for corporate funding. 
Fourthly, in the family businesses that constitute 60% of Italian listed companies (Aidaf, 2017), the main 
shareholder is the CEO and/or the Chairman, increasing the risk that the largest shareholder may misuse 
the company’s resources at the expense of the minority and/or the firm (Atanason, Black and Ciccotello, 
2011). As result, the Italian listed companies face not only the principal-agent issue (Fama and Jensen, 
1983) but also the principal-principal problem (Melis, 2000), i.e. conflicts between blockholders and 
minority shareholders (D’Onza et al., 2014). For this reason, in 2005 the Italian legislator (Law 262/2005 
- The Protection of Savings) extended the slate voting for boards of directors to the Italian Listed 
companies in order to guarantee that minority shareholders have at least one director elected to the board. 
The Italian corporate governance legislation (including soft and hard laws) has experienced substantial 
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changes since 1995. Table 4 shows and explains the milestones of the Italian corporate governance 
legislation from the first guideline (1995) to the latest regulation (2016). 
[INSERT TABLE 4 HERE]
Data
To test our hypotheses, we use several data sources. Firstly, we hand collected data regarding 
corporate governance by analysing each company’s corporate governance reports from 2003-2015. 
Secondly, we hand collected ownership data from the CONSOB database3. In case of missing data in 
either corporate governance reports or the CONSOB database, we analysed another official source called 
‘Il Calepino dell’Azionista’ issued by MedioBanca4. Thirdly, in order to obtain financial data, we used 
the database DataStream by Thomson Reuters. 
We use a sample of Italian companies listed on the STAR segment in the Italian Main Market 
(MTA), Italian Stock Exchange over the period 2003-2015. The STAR segment is dedicated to medium 
companies that voluntarily comply with requirements of excellence in terms of liquidity, information 
transparency and high quality of corporate governance. Given the emphasis on liquidity, information 
transparency and corporate governance, we considered 73 companies listed on the STAR segment in 
2015. We eliminated three non-Italian companies (two from Luxemburg and one from Switzerland). 
Consistent with Barnhart and Rosenstein (1998) and O’Connell and Cramer (2010), we excluded 
companies from the financial services sector (five in total), because they are subject to a special 
3 The CONSOB database is available at http://www.consob.it/mainen/issuers/listed_companies/advanced_search/index.html
4 ‘Il Calepino dell’Azionista’ provides brief reports on all Italian Listed Companies; it is available at 
http://www.mbres.it/en/publications/calepino-dellazionista.
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regulatory environment. The final population is 65 Italian companies listed on the STAR segment over 
13 years with 731 observations in total.
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Variables measurement
Dependent Variable. Consistent with prior studies (Bennedsen, Kongsted, Hans and Nielsen, 2004; Dey, 
Engel and Liu, 2011; Donadelli et al., 2014), the dependent variable is the Return on Assets (ROA), as 
measured by income before depreciation divided by fiscal year-end total assets (Hsu, 2010; Wintoki, 
Linck and Netter, 2012).
Independent Variables. The three main explanatory variables are: board size, independent directors and 
CEO/CM duality. ‘Board Size’5 is measured as the total number of all directors. ‘Independent Directors’ 
is the percentage of independent/nonexecutive directors in management boards6. ‘CEO/CM Duality’ is a 
binary variable which takes a value of one if it is found that the CEO also serves as the chairman (i.e. 
CEO/CM duality), and a value of zero otherwise (Zajac and Westphal, 1995; Conyon and Peck, 1998). 
Control Variables. A number of control variables have been included in the study in order to remove the 
problem of endogeneity. These variables have been used in many prior studies, and are correlated with 
firm performance (Hermalin and Weisbach, 1991; Vafeas and Theodorou, 1998; Bonn et al., 2004; 
Boone, Field, Karpoff and Raheja, 2007; Yammeesri and Herath, 2010). In particular, we consider the 
number of directors appointed by the minority shareholders; the number of roles that directors have in 
other companies; Firm size measured as the natural logarithm of the firm’s total assets (Eisenberg et al., 
1998); Pretax income; Firm age as the number of years since the company foundation; Pre crisis period 
measured as a dummy variable that takes the value one for the years before 2008; otherwise zero; Debt 
as the sum of long and short term debt; market to book value as market value of equity divided by the 
book value of equity. In line with ownership features of the Italian listed companies (Bianchi and 
Enriques, 2005), other variables are collected, namely CEO and shareholder dummy which is a binary 
5 We also use a dummy variable as a proxy for board size; the dummy variable takes the value of one when the board has at least 7 members, 
and zero otherwise.
6 We do not measure the number of members of the supervisory board, as there is no variation between companies during the period 
analysis. The number of independent directors sitting in the supervisory board is always three.
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variable that takes a value of one if the CEO is also a shareholder, otherwise zero (Petrou and Procopiou, 
2016); the percentage of shareholder agreements over the total firms’ property; ownership concentration 
(the percentage of shares held by the largest shareholder of the company); and ownership composition, 
which is measured as the percentage of shares held by institutional investors, the board, management, 
governments, the company itself (own shares), and banks. Table 5 shows variable definitions and sources.
[INSERT TABLE 5 HERE]
Models and Methodology
We develop several models to examine the relationship between corporate governance features 
and firm performance, and validate our hypotheses.
To test Hypothesis 1, we develop the following model:
Firm Performance = 0 + 1 Board sizeit + 2 Board sizeit2 + (3 + 1 Board sizeit)Precrisis +  
Control variablesit + it (1)
where it is the error term.
To test Hypothesis 2, we develop the following model:
Firm Performance = 0 + 1 Independent Directorsit + 2 Independent Directorsit2 + (3 + 1 
Independent Directorsit)Precrisis + +  Control variablesit + it (2)
To test Hypothesis 3, we consider the interaction of the board size with the percentage of 
independent directors in the following model:
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Firm Performance = 0 + (1 + 1 Independent Directorsit)Board sizeit +  Control variablesit + it 
(3)
To test Hypothesis 4, 
Firm Performance =0 + 1 CEO dualityit + (2 +  CEO dualityit)Precrisis +  Control variablesit 
+ it (4)
To validate the previous hypotheses, and in line with previous agency theory studies (e.g. Jensen, 
1993), we substitute the board size variable with a board size dummy variable, that takes the value of 
one when board has at least seven members (otherwise zero). Therefore, we develop the following model:
Firm Performance = 0 + (1 + 1 Independent Directorsit)Board size_Dummy7it +  Control 
variablesit + it (5)
Given concerns about Italian ownership composition (Melis, 2000; D’Onza et al., 2014), we run 
models (1)-(5) a second time, where the main dependent and independent variables remain unchanged 
and where the ownership concentration – which is a control variable - is substituted with the ownership 
composition (Institutional Investors, Board ownership, Management, Government, Own shares, Bank), 
CEO_shareholder dummy and shareholder agreements, as part of the control variables. By doing that, 
we then develop models (6), (7), (8) and (9).
We estimate the models using a panel data methodology and the Generalized Method of Moments 
(GMM), specifically the system GMM estimator, by using Stata14. The advantages of using GMM are 
that it deals with endogeneity (Wintoki, 2007), unobserved heterogeneity and cases where explanatory 
variables are not strictly exogenous 8. Additionally, this approach includes lagged performance as an 
explanatory variable and the other lagged variables (by no more than two periods) as instruments that 
control for both dynamic and simultaneous endogeneity. Consistent with prior studies (Glen, Lee and 
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Singh, 2001; Wintoki, 2012), two lags are sufficient to capture the persistence of performance and to 
ensure dynamic completeness (Wintoki, 2012). Therefore, we include two lags in our GMM model. 
Finally, after running the models, we conduct some specification tests. We run a Hansen test that checks 
for the lack of correlation between the instruments and the random disturbance. In order to assess the 
validity of the instrument variables and the success of the instrumentation process in purging the 
estimates of second order serial correlation (Guest, 2009, p. 395), the Sargan test and the Arellano and 
Bond (1991) test for second order serial correlation are estimated respectively. The diagnostic for the 
instruments are acceptable, as shown in Table 5 and 6. Both Sargan and Arellano and Bond test p-values 
are insignificant for all models, i.e. our results are not influenced by unobserved firms’ effects, 
simultaneous endogeneity, or dynamic endogeneity. Finally, consistent with prior research (Guest, 2009), 
all the models are run an additional time where all variables are winsorised at the 1st and 99th percentile 
to remove some possible effects of outliers.
Results
Summary statistics
Table 6 provides the descriptive statistics and the correlation matrix of the variables. In particular, 
the mean (median) of ROA is 0.03 (0.09). Board size in Italian listed companies ranges from five to 
fifteen directors, with 9.02 (2.49) being the mean (median). The mean board size is below the figure of 
11.67 reported by de Andres et al. (2005) for 10 OECD countries, and also smaller than the fourteen 
reported by Allegrini and Bianchi Martini (2006) for all Italian listed companies. The board size of the 
present sample appears to be generally larger than that of US companies (Linck et al., 2008), which is 
7.5, and also the 8.07 reported by Vafeas and Theodorou (1998) for the UK. Furthermore, 46.5% of 
companies have CEO/CM duality, meaning that almost half of the firms do not comply with the code of 
corporate governance recommendations (i.e. CEO/CM non-duality). This finding also suggests that 
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practice is not consistent with an agency theory approach which encourages CEO/CM non-duality 
(Rechner and Dalton, 1989/1991; Daily and Dalton, 1994a). The average number of independent 
directors sitting on the boards is 3.28 and they represent 36% of the boards, which is similar to the 39% 
reported by Vafeas and Theodorou (1998) for the UK, even though in the last decade the proportion of 
independents in the UK has risen considerably (Pye, 2000), reaching 50% of all board members (De 
Andres et al., 2005). The number of independent directors is rather low; this has also been criticised by 
the Association of Italian Joint Stock Companies (Assonime, 2018). The mean number of directors 
appointed by the minority shareholders through the slate voting is 0.23 with a range from 0 to 3. 
[INSERT TABLE 6 HERE]
Regression results
Table 7 shows the findings from the estimation of Models 1-4. Column 1 refers to Model 1 that 
tests Hypothesis 1; Column 2 refers to Model 2 and tests Hypothesis 2; Column 3 refers to Model 3 that 
combines Models 1 and 2; Column 4 refers to Model 3 that tests Hypothesis 3; Column 5 refers to Model 
4 that tests Hypothesis 4. 
[INSERT TABLE 7 HERE]
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Column 1 of Table 7 shows that the board size has a positive effect on firm performance for 
lower levels of board size (3.909, p<0.01) and a negative effect on firm performance for higher levels of 
board size (-0.019, p <0.01). This result supports Hypothesis 1. This means that at lower levels of board 
size, directors are more likely to co-operate efficiently; however, when the board size increases, the costs 
related to directors consequentially rise, and firm performance declines. Additionally, we find that the 
higher the commitments of directors in other companies (board roles), the lower the firm performance, 
as confirmed in the columns 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 of Table 7. This suggests that if directors spend a lot of time 
and effort in other firms, they are less likely to take the right decisions to maximise performance. 
Consequently, directors should limit their commitments in other companies in order to concentrate on 
corporate decisions in a given firm. In this context, an adequate board size could improve the efficacy of 
the decision-making process due to information sharing (Lehn et al., 2009), allowing the board to take 
the right decisions that maximise firm performance. In the volatile context in which STAR companies 
operate, a larger board size is not justified, because directors have to spend significant time and effort on 
decisions that may affect firm performance. These findings are consistent with the Italian (soft and hard) 
laws of Corporate Governance that recommend an adequate number of directors. 
In the light of the above, our results seem to confirm that a large board of directors could lead to: 
 problems of coordination and communication, because it is difficult to arrange 
board meetings, reach consensus, causing slow transfer of information and a less-efficient 
decision-making process (Judge and Zeithamal, 1992; Jensen, 1993; Bonn et al., 2004; Cheng, 
2008), 
 problems in terms of board cohesiveness, because directors may be less likely to 
share a common goal and to communicate with each other (Evans and Dion, 1991; Lipton and 
Lorsch, 1992), causing greater levels of conflict (Goodstein et al., 1994);
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 free rider problems because the cost to any individual board member of not 
exercising diligence falls in proportion to board size (Lipton and Lorsch, 1992; Guest, 2009);
 greater agency costs, because if board size increases beyond a certain number, 
disadvantages greatly outweigh the initial advantages of having more directors to draw on, causing 
a lower level of corporate performance (Lipton and Lorsch, 1992; Jensen, 1993).
Column 2 of Table 7 also shows that the percentage of independent directors has a positive effect 
on firms’ performance (0.771 and p < 0.05). Thus, the results support Hypothesis 2. More interestingly, 
we find that the percentage of independent directors has a positive effect on firm performance (0.771 and 
p < 0.05) for lower levels of independent directors and a negative effect on firms’ performance (-0.059 
and p<0.05) for higher levels of independent directors. We find the same results by combining Model 1 
and Model 2 (as shown in Column 3). Our findings are in line with the prescription of the Italian 
Corporate Governance laws that recommends an adequate number of independent directors sitting on 
the board. Additionally, these findings are consistent with those displayed in prior research (Agrawal and 
Knoeber, 1996; Bhagat and Black, 2002; Bhagat and Bolton, 2008). Our negative result could be 
explained by the fact that independent directors’ compliance with Italian hard and soft laws of Corporate 
Governance has meant increased costs which have had a negative impact on firm performance. 
Another possible reason for the negative impact of a higher number of independent directors on 
firm performance could be explained by the fact that they might not be so effective in their role because 
CEOs may employ several tactics to neutralise the power of independent directors (Peng, 2004). For 
instance, CEOs – if part of the majority - could appoint directors with experience on other passive boards 
and exclude those with experience on more active boards (Zajac and Westphal, 1996). CEOs may also 
appoint directors who are from strategically irrelevant backgrounds who do not have the knowledge base 
to challenge the CEO’s power and to effectively take part in strategic decision making (Carpenter and 
Westphal, 2001). Alternatively, CEOs may appoint independent directors who are more sympathetic to 
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the Chief Executive (Zajac and Westphal, 1996). So, once again, it could be reasonable to note that the 
potential lack of independence of outside directors could lead to a worsening of performance. 
Additionally, we find that the effects of minority directors (who are all independents) on performance is 
insignificant; this means that their appointments have no impact on firms’ performance, probably due to 
the lack of power they have. Even though independent directors should play a crucial role in effective 
governance of the firm, they may not be able to fulfil their duties effectively and to maximize firm 
performance. Independent directors could thus affect firm performance in a negative manner; they could 
make decisions that do not maximize firm performance in order to avoid hindering controlling 
shareholders’ interests. Furthermore, we ran another test to verify the existence of a U- shaped 
relationship between board size and proportion of independent directors (t-value = 2.37; p<0.01), as 
shown in Figure 1. We found a non-linear relationship between the level of independent directors and 
the board size. Particularly, board size first decreases with the proportion of independent directors at a 
decreasing rate to reach a minimum, after which board size increases at an increasing rate as the 
proportion of independent directors continues to rise.
[INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE]
Column 4 of Table 7 shows that the moderating effect of independent directors in the board size-firm 
performance relationship is negative and significant (-0.959, p<0.01). Our result supports Hypothesis 3. 
This means that increasing the proportion of independent directors relative to board size appears to 
increase the likelihood that firms’ performance will worsen. Presumably, directors, having additional 
roles in other companies, have less time to commit to a given company. This is confirmed by the negative 
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and significant effect of the roles of the board on firms’ performance. Furthermore, the negative impact 
of the interaction (between board size and independent directors) on firms’ performance stresses the 
importance of having a balanced board composition. As shown by Figure 2 (following Albers, 2012; 
Kostyshak, 2015), we found an inverted-U shaped relationship between firm performance and the 
moderating effects of independent directors on the board size. This confirms that the proportion of 
independent directors moderates the inverted U-shaped relationship between the board size and firm 
performance. In other words, firm performance increases with the interaction between board size and 
independent directors at a decreasing rate to reach a maximum, after which firm performance decreases. 
[INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE]
Additionally, in line with some previous agency theory research (Jensen 1993), it has been argued 
that board size should not exceed seven directors. We therefore introduce a dummy variable to represent 
board size: Dummy_7 takes the value of 1 when the board size is more than 7, otherwise 0. Column 6 of 
Table 7 shows that these findings are also supported when the dummy variable of board size (Dummy_7) 
is used as an independent. Particularly, the effects of board size and independent directors, and their 
interaction on firms’ performance, are supported when the board is composed of 7 or more directors. 
Columns 5 of Table 7 show that there are no significant effects of CEO/CM duality on firms’ 
performance7. This result does not support Hypothesis 4. Consistent with Coles and Hesterly (2000), and 
Krause, Semadeni and Cannella (2014), CEO/CM duality and CEO/CM non-duality do not differ in their 
effect on firm performance. This suggests that CEO/CM duality is a more complex issue than the simple 
splitting of roles. The duality is not a random phenomenon (Kang and Zardkoohi, 2005: 786), because it 
depends on different and not easily measurable factors, such as the presence of powerful CEOs who over-
7 We also find a lack of effects on firms’ performance when the Chairman is an executive director, or when a an executive director (other 
than a CEO, like a CFO) acts as a Chairman.  These results are available on request.
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ride board members, CEO personality, his/her beliefs, values, priorities, personal characteristics and 
principles. Furthermore, the CEO/CM duality may also depend on other factors which in part recede 
from agency approach, such as a solution to environmental resource scarcity, complexity and dynamism, 
and conformity to institutional pressures. Our results confirm that there is no single optimal leadership 
structure, as both duality and separation perspectives have related costs and benefits (Brickley et al., 
1997). The lack of significance may be due to the balancing effects between costs and benefits of 
CEO/CM duality. The potential monitoring benefits of non-duality imply the separation of management 
and control. The potential costs of non-duality relate to information asymmetry, inconsistent decisions, 
and extra remuneration in maintaining two directors. Thus, it confirms that it may be overly simplistic to 
argue that CEO/CM duality is uniformly good or bad for firm performance. Even though CEO/CM 
duality may indeed reduce board independence (Rhoades et al., 2001), this does not necessarily mean 
that the firms with CEO/CM duality will perform worse than CEO/CM non-duality companies. On the 
other hand, firms with CEO/CM duality may benefit from having strong and consistent leadership at the 
top, and may minimize some costs of conflicts between the CEO and the board. CEO/CM duality may 
provide the firm with strong leadership and consistent vision fundamental for firm success. 
Given the particular ownership composition of Italian listed companies, we ran further analysis 
on ownership composition (Granado-Peiró and López-Gracia, 2016). In particular, we ran models 1-5 a 
second time while substituting the shareholder concentration variable with six shareholder composition 
variables (including Institutional Investors, Board ownership, Management, Government, Own shares 
and Bank), CEO_shareholder dummy and the percentage of shareholder agreements. Table 8 shows that 
there is no relationship between ownership composition and firm performance, even in the presence of 
shareholder agreements.
[INSERT TABLE 8 HERE]
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Some research points out that results may be driven by industry factors (Cho et al., 2014) and 
years of analysis. We therefore control for industry and year by introducing dummy variables and we 
find that the results confirm our previous findings (results are available from the authors on request). 
Additionally, we introduce a post crisis dummy that has insignificant effects on firm performance for all 
models. Finally, in order to minimise the effects of outliers, we additionally ran all the models a second 
time where all variables are winsorised at the 1st and 99th percentile (Guest, 2009); all results are 
confirmed, and are available on request.
Conclusions and Implications
This research studies the effects of the main corporate governance characteristics (board size, the 
independence of the board and CEO/CM duality) on firm performance among Italian listed companies 
by adopting an agency theory approach. We use a sample of Italian listed companies that adopt the best 
corporate governance practices: those firms listed in the STAR segment over the period from 2003 to 
2015. This research uncovers a number of interesting results that have implications for both scholars and 
practitioners with an interest in corporate governance issues. 
This research contributes to the understanding of the Italian corporate governance where agency 
theory assumptions need to be ‘relaxed’ and adapted to this interesting context. Particularly, this paper 
contributes to the literature on agency theory and listed companies (Di Pietra et al. 2008; D’Onza et al., 
2014) by reconciling some of the conflicting results and explaining some new Italian corporate 
governance insights. Our findings also help to cast light on some of the conflicting results in prior 
research (Melis, 2000; Allegrini and Greco, 2011) inherent in the board structure-performance relation.
First, we find that board size has a positive effect on firm performance for lower levels of board 
size, and negative effects on performance for higher levels of board size. This finding highlights that the 
board of directors should be of an adequate size – but not too large, considering that a largers boardroom 
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does not necessarily result in positive performance. This may be due to the fact that the higher the number 
of directors on a board, the higher the likelihood that they have other external commitments in other 
companies. We find that the higher the number of roles held by directors, the lower the firm performance. 
Therefore, our results highlight that there is no ideal agency-theory archetype model of corporate 
governance (Yoshikawa and Rasheed, 2009) in Italy. In particular, this study emphasises that when 
deciding upon board size, shareholders (who appoint directors) should take into consideration that the 
higher the number of directors, the higher the likelihood of them having other external commitments, 
and hence the higher the possibility that their presence on the board may negatively affect firm 
performance. 
Second, we find that the board of directors, despite the agency theory assumptions, does not 
necessarily benefit from a high number of independent directors; rather a more balanced composition of 
the board is beneficial. In this respect, the percentage of independent directors has a positive effect on 
firm performance for lower levels of independents and negative effects on firm performance for higher 
levels of independents. Our results suggest that the agency theory assumptions in the Italian context need 
to be reconsidered; confirming that independent directors on the board play a prominent role, but they 
do not have to be higher in number than executives. On the other hand, we find no evidence that the 
ownership concentration and composition (although they are not our main independent variables) have 
any effect on firms’ performance. This means that large shareholders may neutralise the costs and 
benefits of their influence/activity on performance. This again suggests that the legislator should 
introduce better regulation in order to control the costs and benefits associated with large ownership. 
Third, the leadership structure (CEO/CM duality) does not seem to play a significant role in 
affecting the firms’ performance. This reconciles the contrasting results of previous research (Krause et 
al., 2014): CEO/CM duality is ‘not a random phenomenon’ (Kang and Zardkoohi, 2005, p. 786), 
especially in Italy where CEO and/or Chair can be the main shareholder and, therefore, it does not appear 
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to have an impact if their roles are split. This means that the CEO duality as a corporate governance 
mechanism is not sufficient on its own to show the benefits of having a divided role between the CEO 
and the CM, despite the suggestions of the Italian corporate governance code. Therefore, it may be 
opportune to consider that each company has its own characteristics where the benefits of the CEO/CM 
(non) duality may vary with respect to the unique characteristics of each company. In effect, when the 
relationship between a CEO and a CM is not productive, it may lead to major governance problems 
(Cadbury, 2002) and therefore to worse firm performance. 
This research has several implications for practice. Most importantly, the composition of the 
board and the number and type of directors is less important than the quality and potential contribution 
of individuals. This is an issue for both regulators and investors. The 2005 Italian legislator extended the 
slate voting for board of directors of listed companies in order to assure that minority shareholders can 
appoint their representative to the board. We find that these minority directors, who are all independents, 
do not appear to have any impact on firms’ performance. This raises the issue of whether they are 
sufficiently powerful to protect the minority’s interests and whether these directors are ineffective in 
preventing exploitation by the major shareholders. We suggest that the Italian corporate governance law 
should enhance the rules and the effectiveness of the minority directors by controlling whether they are 
actually able to impede the main shareholders to expropriate private benefits at the expense of the 
minority. Investors and owners also have a role to play in ensuring that independent directors in particular 
are selected for their experience and strength of character. They must also have the time and commitment 
to act in the best interests of both minority and majority investors. Secondly, ensuring the separation of 
the CEO/CM roles as a control for enhanced corporate governance does not stand up to examination. 
Our findings suggest that a more important control is to ensure the appointment of effective board 
members.
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This research points to some interesting avenues for future research. First, it may be important to 
consider a more comprehensive theoretical framework, such as multiple agency theory (Arthurs, 
Hoskisson, Busenitz and Johnson, 2008) which adopts a more holistic view of corporate governance 
issues. Indeed, it combines different theories starting from agency assumptions (Merendino and Sarens, 
2016). Second, we measure firm performance using ROA as a proxy, which is consistent with previous 
works (Yermack, 1996, Bebchuck and Cohen 2005). However, it would be worthwhile to consider other 
firm performance measures, such as Economic Value Added (Elali, 2006; Adjaoud, Zeghal and Andaleeb, 
2007). Thirdly, due to methodological issues this study focused only on the role and composition of the 
management board. A more appropriate method for examining the supervisory board may be a qualitative 
study of individual board members and their stakeholders. Finally, a future study may include other 
variables, which could help explain the relationship between board of director structures, controlling 
mechanisms and their impact on firms’ performance. Other variables which could be tested include the 
level of expertise (Chan and Li, 2008), education, professional background and the number of meetings 
per year that directors have.
While this research offers several insights into the relationship between internal corporate 
governance mechanisms, some limitations should be pointed out. First, we study Italian listed companies; 
it would also be interesting to study and compare other institutional settings, such as Italian non-listed 
companies. Second, we consider the main board characteristics (composition, size, number of roles, 
number of shares per director) and the firms features (age, year of listing, family business, size, sectors); 
however, future research could also take into account other variables relating to boards of directors, such 
as CEO and independent directors’ tenure, age, experience, education, nationality of directors in Italian 
listed companies and cognitive capabilities.
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Table 1 International Empirical Research on Board size
Author Publication Year Independent Variable Dependent Variable Sample Year(s) of analysis Findings
1. Adams and Mehran 2003 Board size Tobin’s Q, market-to-book ratio
35 publicly traded 
bank holding 
companies
1986-1996
1997-1999 Positive relationship
2. Allam 2018 Board size ROA and Q ratio FTSE All-Share Index 2005-2011 Positive relationship
3. Assenga et al. 2018 Board size ROA, ROE 80+12 Tanzanian listed companies 2006-2013 No relationship
4. Basu et al. 2007 Board size Accounting performance
174 large Japanese 
companies 1992-1996
Negative 
performance – Large 
boards destroy 
corporate value
5. Beiner et al. 2006 Board size Tobin’s Q Swiss Public listed companies 2001
No consistent 
relationship
6. Belkhir 2004 Board size Tobin’s Q, ROA USA financial companies 1995-2002
No convincing 
evidence
7. Bennedsen et al. 2004 Board size ROA Danish companies 1999 Non-linear relationship
8. Bhagat and Black 2002 Board size Tobin’s Q USA Large Public companies 1988-1993
No consistent 
relationship
9. Bozec and Dia 2007 Board size Technical efficiency Canadian Public owned companies 1976-2001
Large companies is 
more effective at 
coping with a 
complex and 
uncertain 
environment
10. Cheng 2008 Board size Tobin’s Q, ROA USA listed companies 1996-2004
Firm with large 
boards of directors 
have less variable 
performance
11. Coles et al. 2008 Board size Tobin’s Q USA large companies 1992-2001
Positive relationship 
(Tobin’s Q increases 
in board size for 
complex firms)
12. Conyon and Peck 1998 Board size ROE UK listed companies 1991-1994 Negative relationship
13. Dalton et al. 1999 Board size Market based measures Us companies
Meta-analysis of 27 
studies with a total of 
131 companies
Positive relationship
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14. de Andres et al. 2005 Board size Market-to-book ratio Tobin’s Q
10 OECD countries 
(450 companies) 1996 Negative relationship
15. de Andres et al. 2005 Board size Tobin’s Q, Market to book value
10 OECD countries 
companies 1996 Negative relationship
16. Donadelli et al. 2014 Board size ROA
Australia, Canada, 
France, Germany, 
Italy, Japan, UK and 
US
2002-2012
Negative relationship 
(especially in 
corruption-sensitive 
industries)
17. Di Pietra et al. 2008 Board size Share price Italian non-financial listed companies 1993-2000 Limited relationship
18. Dwivedi and Jain 2005 Board size Tobin’s Q,
340 large, listed 
Indian firms - 24 
industry groups.
1997–2001 Positive relationship
19. Ehikioya 2009 Board size ROA, ROE, PE and Tobin’s Q
107 firms quoted in 
the Nigerian Stock 
Exchange
1998-2002 Positive relationship
20. Eisenberg et al. 1998 Board size ROA Small and midsize Finnish firms 1992-1998
Negative relationship 
(negative board size 
effect)
21. Guest 2009 Board size Profitability, share returns, Tobin’s Q
2,746 UK listed 
firms 1981-2002 Negative relationship
22. Huther 1997 Board size Total variable cost US Electricity companies 1994 Negative relationship
23. Jensen 1993 Board size
RandD, capital 
expenditures, 
depreciation, 
dividends, market 
value
1,431 firms on 
COMPUSTAT 1979-1990 Negative relationship
24. Kamran et al. 2006 Board size Earnings New Zealand firms 1991-1997 Negative relationship
25. Kao et al. 2018 Board size
ROA, ROE, Tobin’s 
Q, Market-to-book 
value of equity 151 Taiwanese Listed companies 1997-2015 Negative relationship
26. Kathuria and Dash 1999 Board size ROA
504 Indian 
companies belonging 
to 18 industries
1994-1995 Positive relationship
27. Kaymak and Bektas 2008 Board size ROA Turkish banks 2001-2004 No relationship
28. Kiel and Nicholson 2003 Board size Tobin’s Q, ROA Australian Public 
listed companies
1996 Positive relationship 
(board size is 
correlated positively 
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1 RET = market-based measure. It is calculated as the change in stock price plus dividend for the period.
with market value)
29. Kiel and Nicholson 2003 Board size ROA, Tobin’s Q
348 of Australia’s 
largest publicly listed 
companies
1996 Positive relationship
30. Klein 2002 Board size abnormal accruals SandP 500 Sample US 1992–1993 Positive relationship
31. Larmou and Vafeas 2009 Board size
Market to book 
value, Raw stock 
return, Abnormal 
return
Firms with poor 
operating 
performance
1994-2000 Positive relationship
32. Loderer and Peyer 2002 Board size Tobin’s Q Swiss firms 1980-1995 interval 5 years
Negative relationship 
(negative board size 
effect
33. Loderer and Peyer 2002 Board size ROA Swiss firms 1980-1995 interval 5 years
No consistent 
relationship
34. Loderer and Peyer 2002 Board size Market value of equity
All firms traded on 
Switzerland Stock 
Exchange
1980,1985,1990, 
1995 Negative relationship
35. Mak and Kusnadi 2005 Board size Tobin’s Q Singapore Public Listed companies 1995-1996
Negative relationship 
(using OLS) – No 
consistent 
relationship (using 
2SLS)
36. Mak and Kusnadi 2005 Board size Tobin’s Q
230 Singapore firms 
and 230 Malaysian 
firms
1999-2000 Negative relationship
37. O’Connell and 
Cramer 2009 Board size
TOBIN’S Q, ROA, 
RET1
Irish listed 
companies 2001 Negative relationship
38. Ødegaard and Bøhren 2003 Board size Tobin’s Q Norwegian Public listed companies 1989-1997
Negative relationship 
(negative board size 
effect)
39. Postma  van Ees and 
Sterken 2003 Board size
ROA, ROS, ROE, 
Market To Book 
Value
Dutch manufacturing 
companies 1996
Negative relationship 
(negative board size 
effect
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40. Rashid 2018 Board size EBIT
135 listed firms on 
Dhaka Stock 
Exchange 
2006-2011 Positive relationship
41. Rodriguez-Fernandez 
et al. 2014 Board size
ROA, ROE, Tobin’s 
Q
121 companies from 
Madrid Stock 
Exchange 
2009 Positive  relationship
42. Yermack 1996 Board size ROA, ROS, Tobin’s Q US Large companies 1984-1991
Inverse (negative) 
relationship
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Table 2 International Empirical Research on Independent Directors
Author Publication Year
Independent 
Variable
Dependent 
Variable
Sample Year(s) of analysis Findings
43. Agoraki et al. 2009 Independent directors
Stochastic frontier 
model
57 large European 
banks 2002-2006 Inverted U-shaped
44. Agrawal and 
Knober 1996
Independent 
directors Tobin’s Q 400 US companies 1983-1987
Negative 
relationship
45. Allam 2018 Independent directors ROA and Q ratio
FTSE All-Share Index 2005-2011 NO relationship
46. Assenga et al. 2018 Independent directors ROA, ROE
80+12 Tanzanian 
listed companies 2006-2013
Positive 
relationship
47. Barnhart and 
Rosenstein 1998
Independent 
directors Tobin’s Q
321 firms from 
Standard and 
Poor’s 500 dataset
1990 Positive relationship
48. Baysinger and 
Butler 1985
Independent 
directors Tobin’s Q US 266 firms 1970-1980 No relationship
49. Baysinger and 
Butler 1985
Independent 
directors ROE US 266 firms 1970-1980
Positive 
relationship
50. Beasley 1996 Independent directors Accounting fraud
US 75 fraud and 
US 75 no-fraud 
firms
1980-1991
Negative 
relationship (ID 
reduces likely of 
fraud)
51. Bhagat and Black 1998 Independent directors
Tobin’s Q, ROA, 
market adjusted 
stock price returns
334 large US 
public corporations 1985-1995
No convincing 
evidence
52. Bhagat and Black 2002 Independent directors
Tobin’s Q, ROA, 
Ratio of sales to 
assets, Market 
934 large US 
public corporations 1988-1991 No relationship
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adjusted stock price 
returns
53. Borokhovich et al. 1996 Independent directors Abnormal returns
969 CEO 
successions at 588 
large public firms
1970-1988 Positive relationship
54. Brickley et al. 1994 Independent directors
Stock market 
reaction
247 firms adopting 
poison pills 1984-1986
Positive 
relationship
55. Bhatt et al. 2018 2018 Independent directors ROI, ROE, RCI
Malaysian listed 
companies 2008-2013
Positive 
relationship 
(Independent 
directors calculated 
within a CG index)
56. Brown and Caylor 2006 Independent directors
ROE, profit 
margins, dividend 
yields, stock 
repurchases
1868 US firms 
Stock Exchange 2003
Positive 
relationship
57. Byrd and Hickman 1992 Independent directors
Abnormal stock 
returns
128 tender offer 
bids 1980-1987
Positive 
relationship
58. Campa, Marra 2008 Independent directors ROI
Italian Listed 
companies 2005-2006
Positive 
relationship
59. Cotter et al. 1997 Independent directors
Target shareholders 
gains; tender offer 
premium
169 tender offer 
target – traded on 
NYSE, AMEX or 
NASDAQ
1989-1992 Positive relationship
60. Daily and Dalton 1992 Independent directors
ROA, ROE, Price-
Earnings ratio
100 fastest-growing 
small publicly held 
US firms
1990 Positive relationship
61.
De Andres and 
Vallelado 2008 Independent directors
market-to-book 
value ratio
69 commercial 
banks from six 
OECD countries 
(Canada, the US, 
1996–2006 Inverted U-shaped
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and the UK, Spain, 
France, and Italy).
62. de Andres et al. 2005 Independent directors
Market-to-book 
ratio Tobin’s Q
10 OECD countries 
(450 companies) 1996 No relationship
63. Donadelli et al. 2014 Independent directors ROA
Australia, Canada, 
France, Germany, 
Italy, Japan, UK 
and US
2002-2012
Positive 
relationship 
(especially in 
corruption-
sensitive 
industries)
64. Dulewicz and 
Herbert 2004
Independent 
directors
Cash Flow Return 
on Total Assets, 
Sales Return
137 Manufacturing, 
Transport, Service 
Sector UK firms
1997 No relationship
65. El Mir and Sebui 2008 Independent directors EVA 357 us firms 1998-2004
Positive 
relationship
66. Elloumi andGueyie 2001 Independent directors
financial distress 
status of the firm
92 Canadian 
publicly traded 
firms,
1994-1998
Small likelihood of 
financial distress 
(with proportion of 
higher ID)
67. Erickson et al. 2005 Independent directors Tobin’s Q
Canadian public 
firms 1993-1997
Negative 
relationship
68. Ezzamel 
andWatson 1993
Independent 
directors
Return on capital 
employed 113 UK companies 1982-1985
Positive 
relationship
69. Hermalin and 
Weisbach 1991
Independent 
directors Tobin’s Q
142 NYSE 
companies --- No relationship
70. Hill and Snell 1988 Independent directors
Value added per 
employee, ROE,
122 Fortune 500 
firms 1979-1981
Positive 
relationship
71. Hossain et al. 2001 Independent directors Firm performance
New Zealand 
companies
Before and after 
1994
Positive 
relationship
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72. Kaplan and Minton 1994 Independent directors
Company stock 
returns, sales 
growth, change in 
pre-tax income
119 traded 
Japanese 
companies
1981 Positive relationship
73. Kaplan and 
Reishus 1990
Independent 
directors dividend 101 companies 1979-1973
Positive 
relationship
74. Klein 1998 Independent directors
ROA, market value 
of equity minus 
ROA, market returns
485 US firms listed on 
the SandP 500 1992-1993
Insignificant 
relationship
75. Klein 2002 Independent directors
Earnings 
management
692 US listed 
companies 1992-1993 Negative relationship
76. Kao et al. 2018 Independent directors
ROA, ROE, Tobin’s 
Q, Market-to-book 
value of equity 151 Taiwanese Listed companies 1997-2015 Positive relationship
77. Laing and Weir 1999 Independent directors ROA
115 randomly selected 
UK listed companies 1992, 1995
No significant 
relationship
78. Mehran 1995 Independent directors Tobin’s Q, ROA
153 manufacturing 
firms 1979-1980
Insignificant 
relationship
79. O’Connell and 
Cramer 2009
Independent 
directors
TOBIN’S Q, ROA, 
RET2 Iris listed companies 2001 Positive relationship
80. Pearce and Zahra 1992 Independent directors
ROA, ROE, Earnings 
per share
119 Fortune 500 
industrial companies 1983-1989 Positive relationship
81. Rashid 2018 Independent directors EBIT 135 listed firms on Dhaka Stock Exchange 
2006-2011 No relationship
82. Rodriguez-
Fernandez et al. 2014
Independent 
directors
ROA, ROE, Tobin’s 
Q
121 companies from 
Madrid Stock 
Exchange 
2009 Insignificant relationship
2 RET = market-based measure. It is calculated as the change in stock price plus dividend for the period.
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83. Rosenstein and 
Wyatt 1990
Independent 
directors Stock prices reaction US listed companies 1981-1985
Positive relationship 
between stock prices 
and announcement of 
new IDs
84. Schellenger et al. 1989 Independent directors
ROA, ROE, RET, 
risk-adjusted 
shareholder’s 
annualized total 
marker return on 
investment
750 firms listed on the 
Compustat Industrial 1986-1987 Positive relationship
85. Uribe-Bohorquez 
et al. 2018
Independent 
directors Efficiency
2185  companies 
International Sample 2006 to 2015 Positive relationship
86. Vafeas and 
Theodorou 1998
Independent 
directors
Market-to-book ratio, 
ROA
250 UK publicly traded 
firms 1994 No relationship
87. Weisbach 1988 Independent directors
Stock returns, 
earnings,
367 US listed 
companies 1974-1983 Positive relationship
88. Yermack 1996 Independent directors
ROA, ROS, Tobin’s 
Q Us Large companies 1984-1991 Negative relationship
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Table 3 International Empirical Research on CEO/CM duality
Author Publication Year Independent Variable
Dependent 
Variable Sample Year(s) of analysis Findings
75.
Abatecola et al. 2011 CEO/CM duality ---
40 quantitative 
articles published 
in 26 journals
1985-2008 Positive relationship
76.
Abdullah 2004 CEO/CM duality ROA, ROE, EPD, profit margins
Kuala Lumpur 
Listed Companies 1994-1996 No relationship
77.
Allam 2018 CEO/CM duality ROA and Q ratio FTSE All-Share Index 2005-2011 NO relationship
78.
Assenga et al. 2018 Independent directors ROA, ROE
80+12 Tanzanian 
listed companies 2006-2013
Negetive 
relationship
79.
Baliga et al. 1996
CEO/CM duality 
(the announcement 
effect of changes in 
duality structure on 
organizational 
performance)
Daily excess 
returns of stocks 
are selected as they 
are measures of 
organizational 
performance
Fortune 500 
companies 1980-1981
Superior 
performance for 
firm Split CEO-
chair position. 
Positive 
relationship
1) the market is 
indifferent to 
changes in a firm’s 
duality status,
2) the duality-
structure has no 
significant effect 
on the firm’s 
operating 
performance;
3) the duality-
structure has no 
significant effect 
on the firm’s long-
term performance
80. Ballinger and 
Marcel 2010 CEO/CM duality
ROA, Tobin’s Q, 
bankruptcy
540 CEO 
succession events 
at SandP 1500 
firms
1996-1998
Poor negative 
effect of interim 
CEO successions
81.
Berg and Smith 1978 CEO/CM duality ROI, ROE, stock price Fortune 200 firms ---
Negative 
relationship of 
duality with ROI, 
and no relation 
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with ROE or 
change in stock 
price
82.
Boyd 1995 CEO/CM duality ROI 192 publicly traded US companies 1980-1984
Positive 
relationship
83.
Brickley et al. 1997 CEO/CM duality
ROI, Stock return, 
Cumulative 
abnormal return
661 US firms in the 
1989 Forbes 
compensation
1989
Firm with separate 
leadership do not 
perform better. 
Duality firms 
associated with 
better accounting 
performance
84.
Bhatt et al. 2018 2018 CEO/CM duality ROI, ROE, RCI Malaysian listed companies 2008-2013
Positive 
relationship (CEO 
duality calculated 
within a CG index)
85. Cannella and 
Lubatkin 1993 CEO/CM duality ROE 472 succession events 1971-1985
Weak positive 
relation of duality 
with ROE
86.
Chaganti et al. 1985 CEO/CM duality No firm performance
Banking industry – 
comparing 21 
bankrupts firms 
with 21 surviving 
firms
1987-1990 No relationship
87. Daily 1995 CEO/CM duality
Outcomes of 
bankruptcy: 
successful 
reorganization 
(good), liquidation 
(bad)
70 publicly traded 
firms filing for 
bankruptcy 
protection
1980-1986 No effect on firm performance
88.
Daily and Dalton 1992 CEO/CM duality ROA, ROE, Price-Earnings ratio
100 fastest-
growing small 
publicly held US 
firms
1990 No relationship
89. Daily and Dalton 1994a CEO/CM duality bankruptcy
114 publicly traded 
US manufacturing, 
retail, and 
transportation firms
1972-1982 Negative effect on performance
90. Daily and Dalton 1994b CEO/CM duality bankruptcy
100 publicly traded 
US manufacturing, 
retail, and 
transportation firms
1990
No main effect on 
firm performance, 
but strengthened 
the positive effect 
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of board 
independence on 
firm performance
91.
Dalton and Kesner 1993, 1987 CEO/CM duality ROA, ROE, Price-Earnings ratio
186 small publicly 
traded US firm. 
Randomly selected 
of 50 large 
Japanese, United 
Kingdom and 
United States 
industrial 
corporations for a 
total sample of 150
1990,1986
CEO/CM duality n 
performance 
negative 
relationship1) In 
Japan, it is 
evidently unusual 
for the same 
individual to serve 
as CEO and 
chairperson of the 
board. 2) This is 
much more 
frequent in United 
Kingdom
92.
Dalton et al. 1998 CEO/CM duality
Market and 
accounting 
performance 
indicators
Meta-analysis of 
31 studies US 
companies (69 
samples, N= 
12,915)
1987
NO overall 
relationship with 
firm performance
93.
Davidson et al. 2001 CEO/CM duality Cumulative abnormal return
421 CEO 
succession event at 
332 Businessweek 
1000 firms
1992
CEO-board chair 
consolidation has 
negative effect 
only if heir 
apparent is no 
present
94.
Dey et al. 2011 CEO/CM duality ROA
760 companies 
from Compustat 
and ExecuComp 
databases
2001-2009 Positive relationship
95. Donaldson and 
Davis 1991 CEO/CM duality ROE, stock return
329 and 321 US 
companies 1988
Positive 
relationship
96.
Duru et al. 2016 CEO/CM duality ROA, ROE, ROS 17,282 US Companies 1997–2011 
Negative 
relationship
97.
Elsayed 2007 CEO/CM duality Tobin’s Q
92 firms from 
Egyptian Capital 
Market Agency
2000-2004 No significant relationship
98. Faleye 2007 CEO/CM duality Tobin’s Q 3,823 US firms 1995 Dual leadership increases Tobin’s q 
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only in complex 
firms
99. Finkelstein and 
D’Aveni 1994
CEO/CM duality 
and board vigilance ROA
Fortune 200 
companies 1984 and 1986
This association 
changes with 
circumstances-with 
a vigilant board 
considering duality 
to be less desirable 
when firm 
performance is 
good and the CEO 
possesses 
substantial 
information power.
100. He and Wang 2009 CEO/CM duality Market to book ratio
215 large US 
manufacturing 
firms
1996-1999
Strengthened 
positive effect of 
innovative 
knowledge assets 
on firm 
performance
101.
Kao et al. 2018 CEO/CM duality
ROA, ROE, 
Tobin’s Q, Market-
to-book value of 
equity 151 Taiwanese Listed companies 1997-2015 Negative relationship
102. Krause and 
Semadeni 2013 CEO/CM duality
Stock return, mean 
analyst rating
1,053 SandP 1500 
and Fortune 1000 
firms
2002-2006
CEO-board chair 
separation has 
positive effect 
following negative 
weak performance; 
nut negative effect 
following strong 
performance
103.
Lam and Lee 2008 CEO/CM duality
ROA; ROE; return 
on capital 
employed, market-
to-book value of 
equity
Hong Kong listed 
companies 2003/2004
Positive 
relationship in non-
family companies. 
No significant 
relationship in 
family companies
104. Mallette and 
Fowler 1992 CEO/CM duality ROE
673 publicly traded 
U.S.
industrial 
manufacturing
firms
1985 and 1988
Weak positive 
relationship of 
duality with roe
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105. Mueller and Barker 
III 1997 CEO/CM duality ROA
US manufacturing 
listed firms 1977–1993
Positive 
relationship
106. Palmon and Wald 2002 CEO/CM duality announcements abnormal returns
304 companies 
from 
COMPUSTAT
1986-1999
Small firms = 
negative abnormal 
returns when 
changing from dual 
to separate 
leadership. Large 
firms=positive 
abnormal returns
107. Peel and 
O’Donnell 1995 CEO/CM duality
Ownership of 
equity and 
participation in 
share
132 UK industrial 
firms 1992
Negative 
relationship
108. Petrou and 
Procopiou 2016 CEO/CM duality
Earnings 
management 
(discretionary 
accruals)
US public firms 1993-2010 Positive relationship
109. Pi and Timme 1993 CEO/CM duality ROA 112 US bank 1987-1990
Positive 
relationship – 
Superior 
performance for 
firm Split CEO-
chair position
110. Quigley and 
Hambrick 2012 CEO/CM duality ROA, stock return
181 CEO 
succession events 
at publicly traded 
US high-
technology firms
1994-2006
Former CEO 
staying on as board 
chair reduced 
performance 
change following a 
CEO succession
111. Rodriguez-
Fernandez et al. 2014 CEO/CM duality
ROA, ROE, 
Tobin’s Q
121 companies 
from Madrid Stock 
Exchange 
2009 Insignificant relationship
112. Rechner and 
Dalton 1989 CEO/CM duality Shareholder return
141 Fortune 500 
firms 1978-1983 No relationship
113. Rechner and 
Dalton 1991 CEO/CM duality
ROE, ROI, profit 
margin
141 Fortune 500 
firms 1978-1983
CEO/CM duality 
and performance 
negative 
relationship
114.
Rhoades et al. 2001 CEO/CM duality various
Meta-analysis of 
following database: 
Business, 
Business (1971-
1996), Psychology 
(1974-1996), 
Positive 
relationship
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Psychology, 
Economics and 
Public Affairs
Economics (1966-
1996) and Public 
Affairs (1972-
1996)
115.
Worrell et al. 1997 CEO/CM duality Cumulative abnormal return
522 CEO plurality-
creating events at 
438 Businessweek 
1000 firms
1972-1980
Consolidation of 
CEO and board 
chair roles had 
negative effect
116.
Yang and Zhao 2013 CEO/CM duality Tobin’s Q, ROE, ROA, EBIT
Canada-United 
States Free Trade 
Agreement (1989)
1988-1998
Duality firms 
outperform non-
duality ones
no relationship 
(ROE, ROA)
117. Yasser and Al 
Mamun 2015 CEO/CM duality ROA, ROE
Australian, 
Malaysian and 
Pakistani 
2011-2013 No relationship
118.
Yermack 1996 CEO/CM duality Tobin’s Q, ROA, ROS
US Large 
companies 1984-1991
Positive 
relationship
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Table 4 The Chronological Evolution of corporate governance in Italy
Year Name of the Legislation Issuing Body Description
1995 ‘The project of Corporate 
Governance for Italy’
A scientific committee in 
collaboration with 
PriceWaterhouseCoopers
It identifies the key elements for good practice of 
corporate governance, such as roles, responsibilities of 
stakeholders. 
It aligns with the CoSo Report
1997 CONSOB 
Communication No. 
DAC/RM/97001574
CONSOB3 (National 
Commission for Companies 
and Stock Exchange)
It becomes compulsory for boards of directors of listed 
companies to monitor internal corporate governance and 
the roles assigned to executives 
1998 The Draghi Law 
(Legislative Decree No. 
58/1998 - Consolidated 
law on financial 
intermediation)
The Government – the 
Parliament
It tackles some corporate governance key issues, i.e. 
investors’ protection, securities offering, takeover bids, 
disclosure obligations and audit firms.
1999 The Preda Code Committee for the Corporate 
Governance of Listed 
Companies, Italian Stock 
Exchange
It is a voluntary code of best practice and completes the 
Draghi Law by providing recommendations on the board 
of statutory auditors and on boards of directors’ roles, 
composition and methods of appointment. 
2001 Legislative Decree No 
231
‘Criminal liability of 
legal entities’
The Government – the 
Parliament
It provides for a direct liability of legal entities, 
companies and associations for certain crimes 
committed by their representatives/directors and 
introduces corporate compliance programmes which are 
mandatory only for companies listed on the STAR 
segment in the Milan Stock exchange.
2002 Update of the Preda Code Committee for the Corporate 
Governance of Listed 
Companies, Italian Stock 
Exchange
It introduces rules on transactions with related parties
2003 The Vietti Reform or
The Corporate Law 
Reform
The Government – the 
Parliament
It introduces, among the other, the possibility for 
companies to adopt not only the traditional corporate 
governance model but also dualistic and monistic 
models in line with the European practice.
2005 The Savings Law. Law 
no 262/2005
The Parliament It improves the role and capabilities of Supervisory 
Authorities; transparency; consumer protection. It 
enhances the minority shareholders’ rights, by 
introducing the compulsory mechanism called the slate 
voting (‘voto di lista’) where at least 1/5 of the members 
shall be elected from a slate presented by one or more 
minority stakeholders.
2006 Update of the Preda Code 
- now Corporate 
Governance Code
Committee for the Corporate 
Governance of Listed 
Companies, Italian Stock 
Exchange
It provides substantial changes on corporate governance. 
Particularly, every article is divided into three sections: 
principles, criteria and comments. Additionally, other 
changes on shareholders and annual general meetings 
and transparent disclosures have been made on the light 
of the recent Corporate Law Reform (2003) and Savings 
Law (2005) 
2010-
2011
Update of Corporate 
Governance Code
Committee for the Corporate 
Governance of Listed 
Companies, Italian Stock 
Exchange
It is now aligned with the EU recommendation (No. (n. 
2009/385) on directors’ remuneration. In particular, it 
distinguishes between executives and non-executives’ 
remuneration; stock options, golden parachute and 
indemnity in event of dismissal or resignation from 
office The role of board is strengthened and the roles of 
the different internal committees (nomination, 
remuneration and audit) are better clarified. 
2014 Update of Corporate 
Governance Code
Committee for the Corporate 
Governance of Listed 
Companies, Italian Stock 
Exchange
It aligns to the EU recommendation (no. 2014/208) on 
the ‘comply or explain’ approach and to the CONSOB 
recommendations on withdrawal and liquidation value 
of listed joint stock companies’ shares.
3 CONSOB is the public authority responsible for regulating the Italian securities market.
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2015 Update of Corporate 
Governance Code
Committee for the Corporate 
Governance of Listed 
Companies, Italian Stock 
Exchange
It includes provisions on corporate social responsibility 
and whistleblowing (by strengthening the internal 
control and risk management systems). 
2015 ISA Italia 260
(International Standard 
on Auditing)
International Federation of 
Accountants in collaboration 
with the Italian Chartered 
Accountants Institute, the 
Italian Internal Auditors 
Institute and CONSOB.
It requires listed companies to submit to the audit 
committee an annual report on the significant findings 
from the audit, particularly on material weaknesses in 
internal control in relation to the financial reporting 
process. It also requires the listed companies to provide 
annually of the auditor’s independence to the audit 
committee.
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Table 5 Variables Definition and Source
Variable Definition Source
ROA Operating income before depreciation divided by fiscal year-end total assets Datastream
Board size Sum of independent, executive and non-executive directors
Hand collection from companies’ corporate 
governance reports/ CONSOB database/
Independent directors The percentage of Independent directors on the board
Hand collection from companies’ corporate 
governance reports/ CONSOB database
CEO/CM duality Dummy variable. 1 = CEO/CM duality; 0 = CEO/CM non-duality
Hand collection from companies’ corporate 
governance reports/ CONSOB database
Firm size Natural log of total asset Datastream
Pretax income
Company's revenues minus all operating 
expenses, including interest and depreciation, 
before income taxes
Datastream
Debt It is the sum of long and short term debt. Datastream
Market to book value Market value of equity divided by the book value of equity Datastream
Minority Directors The number of directors appointed by the minority shareholders
Hand collection from companies’ corporate 
governance reports/ CONSOB database
Firm Age The numbers of years since the foundation of the company
Hand collection from companies’ corporate 
governance reports/ CONSOB database
Pre crisis Dummy variable. 1 = before 2008; 0 = after 2008 Authors’ calculation
Ownership Composition
Institutional Investors, Board ownership, 
Management, Government, Own shares, 
Bank
Hand collection from companies’ corporate 
governance reports/ CONSOB database
CEO_shareholer_dummy A binary variable that takes a value of one if the CEO is also a shareholder, otherwise zero
Hand collection from companies’ corporate 
governance reports/ CONSOB database
Shareholder Agreements Percentage of shareholder agreements over the total firms’ property
Hand collection from companies’ corporate 
governance reports/ CONSOB database
Ownership Concentration The percentage of shares held by the largest shareholder of the company Authors’ calculation
Industry Dummy Companies’ industries Authors’ calculation
Year Dummy Year of analysis Authors’ calculation
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Table 6 Descriptive statistics and correlation matrix 
Variables Mean Std dev Variables 
tested in the 
regressions
Ln 
ROA
Board 
Size
% 
Independ
ent 
Directors
CEO 
duality
% 
Minority 
Directors
Ownershi
p 
Concentr
ation
Firm Size Firm Age Total 
Debt/Total 
Asset
Market 
value 
to 
Book
ROA 0.03 0.09 Ln ROA 1
Board Size 9.02 2.49 Board Size 0.15 1
Independent 
Directors
3.28 1.42 % 
Independent 
Directors
0.16 0.60 1
CEO duality 0.47 0.5 CEO duality -0.00 -0.33 -0.31 1
Number of 
Minority 
Directors 
0.23 0.57 % Minority 
Directors 
0.05 0.01 0.08 -0.08 1
Ownership 
Concentration
51.47 14.62 Ownership 
Concentratio
n
0.13 0.09 0.04 -0.01 -0.13 1
Firm Size 12.45 1.07 Firm Size 0.08 0.37 0.07 -0.23 0.09 0.02 1
Firm Age 26.14 15.99 Firm Age 0.02 0.25 0.05 0.08 -0.02 -0.01 0.30 1
Total Debt/Total 
Asset
0.11 0.10 Total 
Debt/Total 
Asset
-0.14 0.14 0.19 -0.05 -0.24 0.17 0.16 0.13 1
Market value to 
Book
1.78 1.49 Market value 
to Book
0.18 0.02 0.07 -0.12 -0.01 0.13 0.01 -0.08 -0.05 1
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Table 7 Results – ROA
SPECIFICATION (1) (2) (3)4 (4) (5)5 (6)
Firm Performance (n-1) -.01607 
(0.1193228)
-0.1050098 
(0.18237)
0.0051496 
(0.1717228)
-0.1411585 
(0.1524197)
0.0120786 
(0.1551123)
-(0.0415583 
0.1886145)
Firm Performance (n-2) -.1086387 
(0.0703233)
-0.0962165 
(0.075988)
-.0956285 
(0.0792399)
-0.1260516 
(0.0739482)
-0.1351289 
(0.0607511)**
-0.0415583 
(0.1886145)
Ln Board size 3.9097 
(1.782917)***
27.13073 
(10.45227)***
2.829737 
(1.501662)** 
4.19646 
(1.821449)**
Ln Board size Square -0.0193418 
(0.0080746)***
-5.946351 
(2.379324)**
Ln Board size X Precrisis -.1837703 
(0.473105)
-.6151641 
(0.8786975)
-0.9524983 
(3.295189)
Independent Directors 0.7719282 
(0.3808044)**
17.41513 
(9.52874)*
2.524542 
(1.024469)**
0.4613478 
(0.1845606)***
Independent Directors Square -0.0592602 
(0.0322)**
-3.815486 
(2.15411)*
Independent Directors X 
Precrisis
-0.1670275 
(0.0820328)
-.2671626 
(0.8060701)
-1.244972 
(2.111927)
-.2073972   .59129
37
Ln Board size X Independent 
Directors
-0.9596062 
(0.3819124)***
Board Size Dummy_7 3.043671 
(1.697062)**
Board Size Dummy_7 x 
Independent Directors
-0.4509612 
(0.18288)**
CeoDualityDummy 0.393199 
(0.5382032)
CeoDualityDummy X Precrisis -0.1945666 
(0.5579649)
ExecutiveDualityDummy 0.4679921 
(0.4102953)
Nofdirectorsfromtheminority -.1392218 
(0.8709821)
-0.1540367 
(0.1732819)
-0.0009733 
(0.1816084)
-0.2633479 
(0.2446985)
0.1208805 
(0.2254194)
0.1756375 
(0.2279296)
totBoard_Roles -0.0020557* 
(0.0059638)
-.0116145* 
(0.0076441)
-0.0036276*
(0.0057696)
-0.0059731* 
(0.0126863)
-0.0022102*
(0.0071454)
-0.0007687*
(0.0053219)
OwnershipConcen 0.0108519 
(0.0240295)
0.0109884 
(0.0178817)
0.0072185 
(0.0206225)
0.0159633 
(0.0183714)
0.0055859 
(0.0189748)
0.005174 
(0.0214331)
4 As independent directors are part of the board of directors, we moderate the ‘independent directors’ variable with ‘the board size minus independent directors’
5 To validate our results, we also run other regressions where apart from ‘CEO duality dummy’, ‘Independent directors’ was an additional independent variable. The 
results remained unchanged. We also tested if the results change whether an executive director (other than a CEO) acts as a Chairman. We confirm that our results do 
not change.
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Firm Size 9.4208
(4.4607)
-3.5607 
(3.1517)
-3.3708 
(3.4707)
-2.3108
(6.0807)
-1.3507 
4.6607)
1.2206
(1.5706)
Firm Age -0.0249731 
(0.0280177)
-0.0630786 
(0.0294103)*
-0.0072836 
(0.0349479)
-0.0661081 
(0.029042)*
-0.0322096 
(0.0268913)
-0.8813485 
(0.5502741)
Debt/Total asset -.4452699 
(0.2089969)**
-0.1354625 
(0.1410807)
-0.3522775 
(0.2682131)
-0.0542359 
(0.1763937)
-0.4646542 
(0.2265709)**
-0.3113145 
(0.2748784)
Mrktvaluetobook 0.0746367 
(0.1591701) 
0.64501
(1.55942)
-5.0707
(4.6407)
0.3212916
(1.6251)
0582631 
(0.0620492)
0.152579 
(0.0839277)*
Pretax Income 0.0081
(0.11116)
0.0000138 
(7.3106)*
6.2306
(3.2206)*
0.0000106
(5.3906)
0.0000107
(3.7006)*
3.9406
(4.7206)
Precrisis 0.5440332 
(1.042869)
0.5216106 
(0.2792668)*
1.79384
(1.180139)
2.9032
(7.438385)
0.5534479 
(1.206321)
-0.0716416 
(0.1911915)
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) 
in first differences: 
z =  -0.64  Pr > z =  
0.522
z =  -1.19  Pr > z =  
0.232
z =  -0.88  Pr > z =  
0.380
z =  -1.24  Pr > z =  
0.214
z =  -0.95  Pr > z =  
0.340
z =  -0.39  Pr > z =  
0.696
Sargan test chi2(81)   =  67.66  
Prob > chi2 =  
0.855
chi2(66)   =  40.08  
Prob > chi2 =  
0.995
chi2(51)   =  39.61  
Prob > chi2 =  
0.877
chi2(47)   =  31.49  
Prob > chi2 =  
0.960
chi2(70)   =  61.26  
Prob > chi2 =  
0.763
chi2(43)   =  32.31  
Prob > chi2 =  
0.883
Hansen test chi2(81)   =  50.65  
Prob > chi2 =  
0.997
chi2(66)   =  40.18  
Prob > chi2 =  
0.995
chi2(51)   =  41.21  
Prob > chi2 =  
0.834
chi2(47)   =  40.71  
Prob > chi2 =  
0.729
chi2(70)   =  48.64  
Prob > chi2 =  
0.976
chi2(43)   =  40.48  
Prob > chi2 =  
0.581
Robust Standard Errors are in brackets. Statistically significant at 1 % (***), 5 % (**) and 10 % (*)
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Table 8 Results – ROA
SPECIFICATION (7) (8) (9)6 (10) (11)7 (12)
Firm Performance (n-1) -0.0301376 
(0.194025)
-0.1867143 
(0.2322545)
-0.0445312 
(0.1244416)
-0.092996 
(0.20814)
-0.0857698 
(0.1501715)
0.0214374 
(0.155115)
Firm Performance (n-2) -0.1355133 
(0.0873335)
-0.1497559 
(0.1236723)
-0.1278727 
(0.1009106)
-0.130842 
(0.0867758)
-0.1115762 
(0.0991319)
-0.1329054 
(0.1166331)
Ln Board size 3.572404   
(1.724217)**
16.96988 
(9.285854)*
2.81923 
(1.673141)*
Ln Board size Square -.0196698 
(0.0083322)**
-4.294744 
(2.155327)*
Ln Board size X Precrisis -.1345328 
(0.6889805)
1.245163 
(1.266716)
1.246532 
(2.744172)
Independent Directors 2.002898  
(0.9686215)**
1.8672 
(0.9841582)**
2.234491 
(1.231841)**
0.6949402 
(0.3119171)**
Independent Directors Square -.2157448 
(0.1124796)*
-.0175605 
(0.020933)*
Independent Directors X 
Precrisis
0.0143483 
(0.1664235)
-1.107353 
(1.211925)
0.0120824 
(1.659644)
0.3169844 
(1.111121)
Ln Board size X Independent 
Directors
-0.8552983 
(0.4350785)*
Board Size Dummy_7 3.301081 
(1.999605)*
Board Size Dummy_7 x 
Independent Directors
-.6942081 
(0.3127884)*
CeoDualityDummy -0.0347312 
(0.3217766)
CeoDualityDummy X 
Precrisis
0.3438253 
(0.5343608)
ExecutiveDualityDummy 0.1519822 
(0.416792)
Nofdirectorsfromtheminority -0.8703359 
(1.286095)
-0.2161647 
(0.3068097)
0.1901996 
(0.8655774)
-0.2187942 
(0.3936274)
-0.1506238 
(0.3991665)
-0.1213981 
(0.2984759)
6 As independent directors are part of the board of directors, we moderate the ‘independent directors’ variable with ‘the board size minus independent directors’
7 To validate our results, we also run other regressions where apart from ‘CEO duality dummy’, ‘Independent directors’ was an additional independent variable. 
The results remained unchanged. We also tested if the results change whether an executive director (other than a CEO) acts as a Chairman. We confirm that our 
results do not change
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totBoard_Roles 0.004374 
(0.007057)
0.0033663 
(0.0124272)
0.0167218 
(0.0119817)
0.0005261 
(0.0104105)
-0.0134624 
(0.0148003)
0.0009093 
(0.0066116)
Firm Size -1.3807 (6.1207) 1.9708 (1.6206) 5.2108 (1.1506) -5.2707 (8.0807) 5.7807 (7.3307) -6.2307 (1.6706)
Firm Age 0.0035623 
(0.0458066)
-0.0079549 
(0.0646467)
-0.046446 
(0.0613351)
-0.0397938 
(0.0334547)
-0.0292396 
(0.0339849)
-0.0269289 
(0.7636791)
Debt/Total asset -0.4161632 
(0.2632791)
0.0414144 
(0.3734673)
0.058637 
(0.2294721)
-0.2929735 
(0.366169)
-0.2815191 
(0.1903763)
-0.1679431 
(0.2367262)
Mrktvaluetobook 0.0005929 
(0.0003164)*
-0.018459 
(0.198030)
1.1507
(6.4807)
0.0183003 
0.0670669
0.016645 
(0.0628959)
0.0184064 
(0.1043745)
Pretax Income 0.000011 
(0.0000128)
4.7806
(6.0906)
0.0000148 
(6.8106)*
7.3706
(6.3106)
0.8106
(4.5406)*
5.7606
(2.3906)
Precrisis 0.4954817
(1.5258)
-0.0666788 
(0.659233)
-1.578461 
(2.176168)
-2.036364 
(5.313169)
-0.1266884 
(0.2839448)
0.0900385 
(0.2393535)
NationalInstitSIC 0.0700717 
(0.0471207)
0.0290798 
(0.0410274)
0.0145254 
(0.0378687)
0.0195339 
(0.03625)
-0.0044268 
(0.0310747)
0.0168117 
(0.0322703)
Board ownership -0.4080161 
(0.4795034)
0.3628237 
(0.6153434)
-0.2036537 
(0.3783377)
-0.161082 
(0.3203551)
-0.0221198 
(0.320741)
-0.0238353 
(0.5242992)
Management -0.2695966 
(0.4904016)
-0.208428 
(1.276554)
-0.0482317 
(0.139834)
-0.0329484 
(0.4738833)
-0.2138566 
(0.4164797)
0.383423 
(0.8187439)
Government 0.1627905 
(0.5578397)
-.2097303 
(0.5421578)
-1.117262 
(0.6374076)
0.3185523 
(0.7847626)
-0.5363476 
(0.9820756)
-0.1953897 
(0.7482084)
Own shares -0.0270338 
(0.0468216)
-.0608917 
(0.0985488)
0.0349344 
(0.0843273)
-0.0933413 
(0.0916564)
-0.0322801 
(0.0701314)
-0.0209437 
(0.0800984)
Bank 0.0132498 
(0.0259759)
0363809 
(0.0755319)
0.001306 
(0.0232477)
-0.0104784 
(0.0230708)
-0.0143376 
(0.0175079)
-0.0107848 
(0.0260919)
CEO_Shareholder_Dummy 1.026274 
(1.040444)
-1.230251 
(1.710311)
1.275862 
(1.943851)
-0.3294365 
(1.284339)
-0.0047646 
(0.0100114)
-0.7597851 
(2.381604)
% shareholder agreement 0.0002188 
(.0060121)
-.0157949 
(0.0153933)
-0.0060388 
(0.0102518)
-0.0037324 
(0.0106854)
0.1939985 
(1.053172)
-0.0062136 
(0.0106117)
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) 
in first differences: 
z =  -0.48  Pr > z 
=  0.631
z =  -0.84  Pr > z 
=  0.400
z =  -0.46  Pr > z 
=  0.643
z =  -1.10  Pr > z 
=  0.272
z =  -0.99  Pr > z 
=  0.321
z =  -0.44  Pr > z 
=  0.659
Sargan test chi2(54)   =  
43.53  Prob > chi2 
=  0.845
chi2(28)   =  
22.64  Prob > chi2 
=  0.751
chi2(89)   =  
56.42  Prob > chi2 
=  0.997
chi2(50)   =  
35.95  Prob > chi2 
=  0.933
chi2(70)   =  
52.66  Prob > chi2 
=  0.939
chi2(55)   =  41.29  
Prob > chi2 =  
0.915
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Hansen test chi2(54)   =  
39.29  Prob > chi2 
=  0.934
chi2(28)   =  
23.93  Prob > chi2 
=  0.685
chi2(89)   =  
31.76  Prob > chi2 
=  1.000
chi2(50)   =  
33.56  Prob > chi2 
=  0.964
chi2(70)   =  
45.86  Prob > chi2 
=  0.989
chi2(55)   =  37.81  
Prob > chi2 =  
0.963
Robust Standard Errors are in brackets. Statistically significant at 1 % (***), 5 % (**) and 10 % (*)
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Figure 1. U-shaped relationship between Board of Directors and independent 
directors 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Inverted-U shape relationship between the interaction board size-
independent directors and firm performance 
 
  
 
 
 
 
independent directors
board size X independent directors
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